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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS MISCONTRUED
THIS COURT'S DECISION OF LEIGH
FURNITURE AND HAS MISSTATED THE
ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO FIND THE TORT OF
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC
RELATIONS.
Respondents in their Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ
of Certiorari have listed a number of acts which they claim
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constitute the "improper means" of Sampson in this affair.
(Respondents Brief, pp. 1-14).

First, it should be observed that

many of these purported "improper means" were not specifically
relied uon by the lower court in making its decision.
Petition, pp. 11-12.

See,

Thus, Respondents have again attempted to

expand the claimed wrongful acts which were not utilized by the
court in reaching its decision.
Moreover, even if it is assumed that all of the various
events listed by Respondents constitute the "improper means"
relied upon by the court, a finding of predatory conduct still
cannot be made.

It is undisputed that both Sampson and Richins

were in a hotly contested battle over the control of the limited
partnerships.

As noted in the Petition, the reasons that Sampson

even came into the picture were simply that Richins' business was
financially collapsing and Richins voluntarily withdrew from any
control thereby essentially throwing supervision of the limited
partners into Sampson's lap.

Later, Richins, for whatever reason,

decided he wanted the control back and battled furiously with
Sampson and certain limited partners to regain control.
Admittedly, both parties did everything they could to
strengthen their own position and weaken that of the other.
made mistakes in judgment and in legal technicalities.

However,

it is submitted that neither party can be said to have used
"improper means" during this raging battle.

Both parties

attempted to influence the various limited partners by
communicating with them both directly and indirectly.
parties attempted to gain legal control of the general
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Both

Both

partnerships in order to receive and distribute the assets of the
partnerships.

Both parties believed that they were in the right

and that the other party was in the wrong.
As noted in the Petition, however, none of these actions are
of the type of conduct specifically prohibited in the Leigh
Furniture case or in the Oregon decisions upon which Leigh
Furniture was based.

If this type of action is prohibited then

every attempted take-over of a corporation, every stockholders1
election for new directors, and hundreds of other examples which
occur every day in the business environment would give rise to a
myriad of tortious interference lawsuits.
There is clearly certain types of conduct which under any
circumstances would give rise to liability.

If Sampson had hired

thugs to intimidate Richins into withdrawing from the contest, if
Sampson had bribed government officials or other interested
parties, if Sampson had committed fraud or attempted to use
unlawful trade practices to drive Richins out of business, then no
claim could now be asserted by Sampson in this case.
these types of blatant acts did not occur.

However,

Rather, Sampson is

charged with giving erroneous legal advice, failing to ethically
protect the interests of Richins even though he believed he never
represented Richins, assisting the Internal Revenue in collecting
on delinquent taxes owed by Richins, and a host of other acts
which in and of themselves cannot be said to be predatory per
se.
In Leigh Furniture the defendant filed two lawsuits
against the plaintiffs.

The filing of a lawsuit cannot be said to
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be an "improper means" in and of itself.

Thousands of lawsuits

are filed each week by parties seeking to assert valid claims.
Yet, this Court concluded that the filing of the lawsuit was an
"improper means" because the lawsuits were "groundless".

Thus,

this Court essentially determined as a factual matter that the
suits were filed in bad faith for the sole purpose of injuring the
plaintiff.

It was not the filing of a lawsuit but the filing of a

bad faith lawsuit which created liability in that case.

This

distinction is critical and must be explained in a subsequent
decision to prevent the present confusion which now exists in the
lower courts.
Richins acknowledges that the lower court entered
inconsistent findings as to the intentions of Sampson.
Brief, pp.

17-18).

(Richins1

While finding, on the one hand, that Sampson

was motivated by a vendetta to oust Richins, the court also found
that Sampson acted in good faith in trying to represent the
interests of the limited partners.

The court analyzed good faith

in terms of punitive damages but failed to do so in terms of
"improper means".
A review of the cases in which tortious interference claims
are made reveals that almost all of them will involve instances
where both compensatory and punitive damages are allowed.

In

Leigh Furniture, for example, the same bad faith which created the
"groundless lawsuit" also gave rise to the punitive damage award.
In this case, however, there is an internal inconsistency with
finding that Sampson acted improperly but did so for a proper
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motive and with good intentions.
Finally, Richins' claim that "good faith" is a privilege is
simply wrong.

(Richins1 Brief, p.

18). As noted in the Petition

a person who asserts a privilege does so regardless of any finding
of tortious liability.

The status of the person rather than his

good faith belief is what gives the protection to circumvent
liability from the tort.

For example, in Searle v. Johnson, 709

P.2d 328 (Utah 1985) this Court held that the privilege of
petitioning the government for grievances overrides any action of
boycotting which would otherwise be considered tortious
interference.

In effect, therefore, a "privilege" immunizes an

otherwise culpable defendant.
For the reasons originally stated in the Petition, therefore,
the Court of Appeals erred in failing to recognize the various
distinctions required in analyzing the conduct in a tortious
interference case and therefore this Court should exercise its
power to correct the present confusion and injustice.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY APPLIED
APPELLATE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION IN
CREATING A FINDING OF FACT FOR SPECIAL
DAMAGES WHICH WAS NEVER MADE BY THE LOWER
COURT AND WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE LOWER
COURT'S SPECIFIC FINDINGS.
Richins contends that the discussion by the court on page 232
of its Verdict somehow justifies the finding on page 234 of
$250,000 general damages.
several reasons.

This argument is clearly incorrect for

First, the lower court specifically informed

counsel during the motion for new trial that the $250,000 was
considered as general damages.

It is therefore a complete fiction
-5-

to try to find a justification for this award in the Court's
Findings when the Court did not believe that specific itemized
damages were necessary.
Second, the amount in the bank account of $288,597 is
obviously not $250,000.

Moreover, the amount discussed on page

232 of the Court's Verdict which Richins now recites is $274,320.
Thus, none of the three amounts are the same.
Finally, the Court never concluded that the money from the
bank accounts was wrongfully used by Sampson but instead
essentially concluded that the money had been used on behalf of
the limited partnerships.

Without this finding of wrongful taking

no award can be justified.
Richins then cites several cases of this Court which
supposedly justifies the actions of the Court of Appeals and the
lower court.

(Richins1 Brief, pp.

20-22).

The Peterson, Allphin

and Foss Lewis & Sons Construction Co. cases all involve the
application of legal theories to affirm a decision of the lower
court.

In each instance, a statute or other legal principle was

applied by the appellate court even though it had not been applied
by the district court.

This rule, however, is not appropriate in

the instant case since we are not dealing with legal principles of
liability but factual findings.
The Bastian and Winsness cases are also illustrative of
the errors committed.

In Winsness the lower court dismissed a

lawsuit for failure of the plaintiff to prove lost profits from
the unlawful closing of a service station.

This Court held that

there were means available by which the plaintiff could produce
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credible evidence to establish those profits and therefore it was
improper to dismiss the claim on the basis of speculation.

(In

light of Richins' footnote 8 of his Brief, p. 21, it may be noted
that Sampsonfs present counsel served as co-counsel in the
Winsness case for the successful appellant).
The Bastian case relied upon by Richins strongly supports
the position of Sampson.

In that case the general principles of

speculative damages was cited and the court noted that a defendant
may not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be
proved with precision.

In reversing the decision of the lower

court, however, this Court stated:
In this case, however, we have no way of knowing
from the Findings of Fact on what basis the crop damages
were computed. The Findings do not indicate either the
theory on which the damages were computed or the dollar
values used to reach the figure of $2,966. The Findings
simply state that the damage to the crop amounted to
that figure. . . .
The Findings of Fact must provide a basis for
determining whether there is a rational basis for the
award of damages. Proper findings are essential to
enable this Court to perform its function of assuring
that the findings support the judgment and that the
evidence supports the findings. . . .
Our concern as to the basis for the damage award is
furthered by a minute entry made by the trial judge
showing damage of $2,817 to the crops, the cost of
harvesting to be $1,408.75, the value of stubble and
court costs to be $1,568 and damage to the pipe of $500.
We are not able to ascertain from these or any other
figures how the award of $2,966 was computed.
Therefore, we have no alternative but to remand the case
for the entry of findings which supports the damage
award, or if the award is erroneous for a
redetermination of damages. See, Silliman v.
Powell, Utah, 642 P.2d 388 (1982). 661 P.2d 953, 597
(Utah 1983) .
Here, there is equally no basis to justify the $250,000 award
and the Court of Appeals erred in applying the principle of
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speculative damages to the facts of this case*
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, therefore, Petitioner respectfully
requests that certiorari be granted and that these manifest errors
be corrected.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of May, 1989.

Craig S\jCook
Attorney' for Sampson
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